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Recent Decisions
TRADE REGULATION - UNFAIR COMPETITION -
IMITATION OF PRODUCTS
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964),
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lightng, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
In two recent Supreme Court cases, the question presented involved
the relationship of state unfair competition laws to federal patent laws.
The decisions appear to have been cases of "first impression" in
that it was necessary for the Court to invoke federal policy respecting
patent law in order to prevent states from granting perpetual protection
to unpatented or unpatentable products. The source of this dominant
federal policy is found in the Constitution wherein Congress is given the
power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited tumes to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."' Pursuant to this constitutional
authority, Congress has enacted laws governing the use of patents and
copyrights and the conditions under whuch they may be granted.' And
when Congress has preempted the field, as is the case with patents and
copyrights, it is fundamental that conflicting state law must yield to
federal law and policy.3 Such reasoning was determinative in the cases
here under discussion.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co.,4 the respondent, Stiffel Com-
pany, secured design and mechanical patents on a "pole lamp" which
petitioner, Sears, subsequently copied and sold at a greatly reduced price.
There were no identifying tags on the Sears lamp, although certain labels
did appear on the cartons delivered to customers. In a suit for patent
infringement, the district court held Stiffel's patents invalid for want
of invention, yet found the lamps to be so alike as to give rise to con-
fusion.' In this finding the court enjoined Sears from selling pole lamps
identical to or confusingly similar to Stiffel's lamp. The circuit court
affirmed the district court's conclusion that there need only be a likeli-
hood of confusion to sustain a holding of unfair competition.' The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "because of the federal patent
laws a state may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted,
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
2. 17 U.S.C §5 1-216 (1958); 35 U.S.C. §9 1-293 (1958).
3. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
4. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
5. The decision of the federal district court has not been reported.
6. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963)
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prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such
copying."3
7
A companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,8 was
decided on facts remarkably similar to those in Sears. It was found that
several companies were manufacturing similar fluorescent light fixtures
having reflectors with cross ribs. However, respondent Day-Brite had
extended the ribs down the sides of the fixture thereby preventing warp-
age, and had obtained a design patent on the novel appearance. Peti-
tioner Compco subsequently manufactured almost exact copies of the
fixture and sold them in clearly marked containers. The district court
held the design patent invalid, yet held that the petitioner's acts con-
stituted unfair competition since the imitation was likely to cause con-
fusion in the trade.9 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that
Day-Brite's design identified Day-Brite to the trade thereby constituting
a "protectable" right under Illinois law 0  The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a design not entitled to a design patent may be copied at
will even though it identifies the maker to the trade. This decision was
based on the ground that state laws prohibiting such copying are in
conflict with federal patent and copyright laws." The essence of
this conflict is that states could grant perpetual protection to unpatentable
products which federal law would declare to be in the public domain.'2
Effect on Unfair Competition Laws.-Prior to these decasions, it was
well settled that a design unprotected by a federal patent or copyright
could be freely copied except for certain restrictions imposed by state
laws of unfair competition.' 3  Claims of unfair competition often arise
where one manufacturer has copied the design of another's product. State
law, by the prevailing view, governs such a claim brought in a federal
7. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964).
8. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
9. The decision of the federal district court has not been reported.
10. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
11. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)
12. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), where it is said:
[Tbo allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of
an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit
the State to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs
to the public. The result would be that while federal law grants only 14 or 17
years' protection to genuine inventions, States could allow perpetual protection
to articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitu-
tional standards. This would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent
system to be tolerated. Id. at 231-32.
13. E.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sandee Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961); American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255,
272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); General Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S.
Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir. 1948); 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETMION &
TRADE-MARKS § 16.2 (2d ed. 1950).
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court.14 Because fraud is the essence of unfair competition, imitation per
se is not sufficient to support a claim of unfair competition. 5 Therefore,
to establish a cause of action under unfair competition laws, the plaintiff
must show some unfair practice beyond mere imitation of design. 6 One
such unfair practice is "palming off" which is an attempt by the copier
of a design to sell his own goods as those of his competitor." Another
unfair practice is the imitation of nonfunctional features'" which have
acquired secondary meaning. Generally, a design has secondary mean-
ing when it identifies the product's source to the public and purchasers
are motivated to buy the product because of its source.' 9 A majority of
courts will enjoin imitation only when the design involved, is nonfunc-
tional,"0 but in rare instances a functional feature may acquire secondary
meaning and the imitator may be required to take reasonable steps to
distinguish his copy from the original.2 ' However, these foregoing rules
are not inflexible and are given various shades of meaning by the courts. 2
To what extent these rules have been affected by the Sears and
14. Prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) federal law governed unfair com-
petition claims brought in federal courts. Some courts have applied a combination of federal
and state law. See generally Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d
538, 540 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
15. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sandee Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 963 (1961); Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133
F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1943).
16. 1 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 16.2 n.52.
17. Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 270 (7th
Cit. 1943); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 452-53 (7th Cit. 1939).
18. Nonfunctional features are those which are adapted mainly for identification and ap-
pearance as opposed to commercial necessity. Paglier v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339,
343 (9th Cir. 1952).
19. Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395, 397 (2d Cir. 1947); Zangerle &
Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1943).
The application of the secondary meaning doctrine depends greatly upon whether the particu-
lar features in question are functional or nonfunctional. Some courts equate functionality
with commercial success. Note, Unfair Competston and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64
COLUM. L REV. 544, 568 (1964) Other courts adopt the rule that a feature is functional
"if it affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing,
handling or using them " RESrATEMENT, TORTS § 742 (1938).
20. Pollack, Unfair Trading By Product Simulatton: Rule or Rankle? 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 74,
76 (1962); Note, 72 HARV. L REV. 1520, 1527 (1959).
21. J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941); RESTATE-
MNer, TORTS 5 741 (1938).
22. Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Sears and Compco the Seventh Circuit dis-
pensed with the traditional requirement that there be a "palming off" in favor of a broader
standard that merely a likelihood of confusion as to source need be shown to support a claim
of unfair competition. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cit.
1962). The justification for this change, however, was derived from Illinois- trade name
cases. Independent Nail & Packing Co. v. Stronghold Screw Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 921, 926
(7th Cit. 1953); Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 421, 38
N.E.2d 754, 758 (1941); Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 IlL. App.
451, 454-55, 46 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1943). These cases are substantially distinguishable from
product simulation cases, making it questionable whether a broadened standard should be
applied to product simulation cases.
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Compco decisions will remain a problem of interpretation for lower
courts. Most troublesome to manufacturers now seeking protection under
state law is the sweeping statement in the Compco opinion to the effect
that the actual acts of copying and selling unpatented or uncopyrighted
products may not be enjoined under state law even though any of the
following elements are present: (1) the copied design is "nonfunctional"
and the article could be made in some other way; (2) the copied design
has "secondary meaning" which identifies the maker to the trade; and
(3) "confusion" may arise among purchasers. These elements are now
to be used only as relevant evidence in applying state law requiring
labeling. Not so clear, however, is the present status of palming off
which was at one time regarded as the essence of unfair competition.
Palming off clearly remains as a basis for imposing liability for failure
to comply with a labeling law, although it is not clear after Sears and
Compco whether it survives as a basis for prohibiting or imposing lia-
bility for the actual acts of copying and selling. It is apparent that even
palming off may not survive in this latter instance since "neither these
facts nor any others" can furnish such a basis.25 Nevertheless, as Justice
Harlan points out in his concurring opinion in Compcoy when copying
has been undertaken with the dominant purpose of palming off and
deceiving customers, a state should not have to tolerate such "predatory
business practices."26 Theoretically, in cases of palming off, liability
should be imposed not for the acts of copying and selling, but for the
accompanying fraud, and the originator should be permitted to protect
the interest of consumers against deception, not his own interest.
23. In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), the court said:
A State of course has power to impose liability upon those who, knowing that the
public is relying upon an original manufacturer s reputation for quality and integ-
rity, deceive the public by palming off their copies as the original. That an article
copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other way, that the design
is "nonfunctional" and not essential to the use of either article, that the configura-
tion of the article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the
maker to the trade, or that there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to which
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a
State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and regardless of the
copier s motives, neither these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing
liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling." Id. at 238.
24. The issue as to the present status of "palming off" remains obscure in light of the
Compco decision. On the one hand, the Supreme Court is apprehensive to allow an expanding
doctrine of "palming off" to encroach upon an area of exclusive federal protection. On the
other hand, it is plausible that "palming off" survives as a limited basis for imposing pro-
hibitions against copying and selling in only the most extreme cases where there has been
outright fraud or deception beyond mere customer confusion.
25. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964) (concurring
opinion).
26. 334 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1964).
27 1d. at 757
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Lower courts have by no means agreed as to the ultimate effect of
Sears and Compco. In subsequent cases of unfair competition, several
decisions have reached inconsistent condusions as to the scope of state
protection in this area. A recent case decided on facts similar to
those in Sears and Compco is Aerosal Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co."8
There, the defendant copied and sold plaintiff's unpatented spray tips.
The district court's conclusion that defendant's acts were sufficient to
constitute unfair competition was reversed by the Seventh Circuit which
held that there was no evidence that defendant had "palmed off its spray
tips as the plaintiff's - nor is there evidence of any intent or attempt
to deceive or mislead customers as to their origin.""7 This view has
been adopted by a majority of courts28 in light of Sears and Compco,
and by negative inference it appears that "palming off" has survived as
a basis for establishing unfair competition.
The California courts, however, have adopted an extreme position,
holding that Sears and Compco deny any state relief whatsoever against
copying" or interference with customers,"0 and that plaintiffs must
rely solely on the federal patent laws for protection.3' Although
28. In International Biotical Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 528
(B.D.N.Y. 1964), the court refused to rule on infringement because the patent involved had
not been adjudicated, yet came to the conclusion that it was not unfair competition for defen-
dant to copy and sell plaintiff's heat lamp. The court agreed with the exceptions to Sears
and Compco that relief is limited to situations where defendant has misled consumers or has
participated in a deceptive practice such as palming off. Kingsway, Inc. v. Werner, 233 F.
Supp. 102 (ED. Mo. 1964) involved trademark infringement as well as product simulation
where the defendant copied plaintiff's chessmen and used a similar trademark. Recovery for
unfair competition was denied because there was no evidence presented that defendant palmed
off its chessmen. Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 143 U.S.P.Q. 94 (N.D.
IIl. 1964), involved package simulation rather than product simulation. The court was of
the opinion that Sears was not entirely applicable to package simulation cases and concluded,
after a thorough discussion of Illinois unfair competition law, that plaintiff's package was not
entitled to protection without- a showing of palming off. It was emphasized that the interest
to be protected is that of the consumer who would be deceived by palming off, and the original
manufacturer or designer comes into court to protect the consumer's interest, not his own.
In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (on
motion to dismiss in light of Compco), no claim of unfair competition could be based on
merely copying an article unless there had been palming off or other unfair practice. In
Wolf & Vine, Inc. v. Pioneer Display Fixture Co., 142 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.Y- Sup. Ct. 1964),
although plaintiffs models had been copied down to the last detail, the court held that relief
must be denied in the absence of palming off.
29. The recent case of Duplex Straw Dispenser Co. v. Harold Leonard & Co., 229 F. Supp.
401 (S.D. Cal. 1964), involved an action for infringement of a design patent and unfair
competition. The design patent on a straw dispenser was held invalid and although copying
the device may have prompted the cry of "foul," the court said that copying thereof is not
prohibited by law.
30. In Jerrold Stephens Co. v. Alladin Plastics, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 536 (S.D. Cal. 1964), a
declaratory judgment was rendered for plaintiff to the effect that the design patent on certain
plastic chairs was invalid. Defendant counterclaimed for unfair competition based upon an
interference with his customers. The court held that Sears and Compco settle the proposition
that when a party depends upon federal patent law, it cannot recover under state law for
unfair competition.
31. An extreme position was taken in Titelock Carpet Strip Co. v. Klasner, 142 U.S.P.Q.
1965]
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the specific problem of "palming off" has not been dealt with in Cali-
formua since Sears and Compco, it is doubtful that relief would be granted
in such a case. Moreover, since California has no labeling law requir-
ing the imitator to distinguish his copy from the original, even the inter-
est of the consumer against deception is apparently afforded no protec-
tion.
Effect on Copyrzght Laws.-Fortunately, Sears and Compco have not
had such a devastating effect on copyright litigation. Despite the fact
that the cases did not specifically involve copyrights, observations were
made in both opinions as to the relation between federal copyright law
and a state's prohibition against copying." In the absence of federal
copyright protection, one must rely on common law protection afforded
to unpublished works. The distinction between protection afforded un-
published works under a common law copyright and the protection
afforded an unpatented article under state unfair competition laws is
emphasized in Edgar H. Wood Associates v Skene."3 Reference is made
there to the holding in Compco that federal policy allows one to freely
copy whatever the patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain,
but the court goes on to say that unpublished works have not been left
in the public domain since a state's control over them has been preserved
by the Copyright Act.34 Generally, any original unpublished work which
embodies "some creative intellectual or artistic contribution" falls within
the scope of protection. "
The decisions in the instant cases have clearly established that recovery
for unfair competition in product simulation cases should be denied
even though the elements of secondary meaning, nonfunctional features,
405 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964), when defendant not only copied plaintiffs machine down to the
last detail, but also, as plaintiffs former employee, gained access to plaintiff's premises for
the purpose of collecting scrap parts when he in fact intended to reconstruct a machine. The
court held that plaintiff must rely solely upon patent law for any protection against copying.
32. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-29, 232-33 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)
33. 197 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1964). The same effect was reached in Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 726, 248 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct.
1964), where the court ruled that an unauthorized use of an "off the air" recording of a
network radio announcer's report of President Kennedy's assassination constituted an infringe-
ment of a common law copyright. The court said there was an appropriation of the an-
nouncer s distinctive personality which is a valuable property right.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958) provides:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or
proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the
copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to
obtain damages therefor.
35. Ringer, The Unauthortzed Duplication of Sound Recordings, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, COPYRIGHT LAw REviSIONS 11 (Study No. 26, 1961) This study also points out an
important distinction between unfair competition and common law copyright. The concept
of unfair competition only protects against unfatr use in business, whereas a common law
copyright protects against any unauthorized use.
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